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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
C & J INDUSTRIES, INC., ) 
a corporation, A. ROBERT 
COLLINS and GLADE N. ) 
JAMES, 
) 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants, ) 
Case No. 18327 
vs. ) 
EDWARD o. BAILEY and ) 
RUTH C. BAILEY, his wife, 
) 
Defendants-
Respondents. ) 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a contract dispute. At issue is whether 
the acts of Plaintiffs-Apellants triggered an acceleration 
clause in a contract which provides: 
"In the event Buyer desires to sell or 
assign, transfer or convey Buyer's rights 
under this contract or Buyer's interest in 
said premises then and in that event the 
Buyer must pay in full the outstandinq 
balance due on this contract prior to said 
transaction." 
It is the position of Plaintiffs-Appellants that: 
1. C & J Industries is clearly identified as buyer 
in the Uniform Real Estate contract; and 
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2. The only liability of Collins and James in 
respect to the Uniform Real Estate contract is as guarantors; 
and 
3. The sale of a portion of the real estate by Collins 
and James as individuals did not trigger the acceleration clause. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case was tried in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, on remand from the Utah Supreme 
Court. The Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge, presided at the 
hearing. 
The case had been remanded by the Supreme Court 
to determine the question of agency. 
"It is apparent from the second 
contract -- and the Baileys consis-
tently point out -- that the buyer 
under the first contract, C & J, 
is not the seller under the second 
contract. It is therefore necessary 
to remand this matter for a deter-
mination of whether, in acting as 
sellers under the second contract, 
Collins and James were acting for 
C & J." C & J Industries v. Bailey, 
618 P.2d 58 (Ut. 1980). 
After all exhibits had been admitted and all witnesses 
had been examined, Judge Conder made a finding from the record 
that C & J Industries was a de facto corporation at the time 
of the second contract, and that if Collins and James were 
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buyers under the original contract, then the question of agency 
was not important (TR. 59, 60). Judge Conder then requested 
briefs on the· question he had put earlier as to whether the 
signatures of Collins and James in the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract made them "buyers" on that contract (TR. 58). He 
thus identified the issue he thought was decisive as, "Who 
is it that is under contract here?" (TR. 59). Both parties 
submitted post-hearing memoranda in support of their respective 
positions. 
On March 17, 1982, judgment was entered for Defendants-
Respondents holding that the Appellants, by their actions, 
had triggered the acceleration clause of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the decision of the lower 
court reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 13, 1978, Edwardo. Bailey and Ruth C. Bailey, 
as sellers, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with 
C & J Industries, as buyer. At the same time, a separate 
document entitled "Guaranty" was executed between the Baileys 
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and A. Robert Collins and Glade N. James who personally and 
individually guaranteed performance of C & J Industries (Ex. 
P-1, ~l). The signature block on both documents appeared 
as follows: 
SELLER: 
/s/ Edward O. Bailey 
Edward o. Bailey 
/s/ Ruth C. Bailey 
Ruth c. Bailey 
BUYER: 
C & J INDUSTRIES INCORPORATED 
By /s/ A. Robert Collins 
/s/ A. Robert Collins 
A. Robert Collins 
/s/ Glade N. James 
Glade N. James 
On March 9, 1979, Collins and James sold a portion 
of the property to Mr. and Mrs. Burgie. Shortly thereafter, 
the Baileys sent a document to C & J, Collins and James, the 
gravamen of which was that the second contract, with Collins 
and James as sellers, breached the terms of the first contract 
in which C & J was the buyer. Paragraph 3(a) of the first 
contract provides: 
"In the event Buyer desires to sell or 
assign, transfer or convey Buyer's rights 
under this contract or Buyer's interest in 
said premises then and in that event the 
Buyer must pay in full the outstanding 
balance due on this contract prior to 
said transaction." 
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Appellants filed a declaratory judgment action in the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County seeking, among 
other things, a declaration that C & J be permitted to continue 
to make monthly payments under the contract as originally agreed 
and that the facts of the case did not operate to accelerate all 
future payments. Appellants' motion for summary judgment was 
granted and Respondent appealed to this Court which reversed 
the decision of the trial court and remanded the case for deter-
mination of whether Collins and James as sellers in the second 
contract were acting for C & J. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
IF COLLINS AND JAMES WERE NOT BUYERS UNDER 
THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT WITH THE 
BAILEYS, OR IF COLLINS AND JAMES WERE NOT 
ACTING AS AGENTS OF C & J INDUSTRIES 
INCORPORATED WHEN THE PROPERTY WAS SOLD TO 
A THIRD PARTY, THEN THE SALE OF A PORTION OF 
THE REAL ESTATE TO THE BURGIES DID NOT TRIGGER 
THE ACCELERATION CLAUSE IN THE FIRST CONTRACT. 
Paragraph 3(a) of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
with the Baileys provides for acceleration of the outstanding 
contract balance if the Buyer "desires to sell or assian, transfer 
or convey Buyer's rights under this contract." 
There are two ways in which the transfer of a portion 
of the property to the Burqies could have been done by the Buyer 
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under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. First, if Collins and 
James were principals to that contract, they would be con-
sidered buyers for the purpose of the acceleration clause. 
Second, if Collins and James were acting as agents for C & J 
Industries in making the sale, then the transfer would also be 
by the buyer since the acts of the agents of a corporation are 
the acts of the corporation. Miller v. Arnal Corp., 632 P.2d 
987 (Ariz.App., 1981). 
II 
THE EXECUTION OF CONTEMPORANEOUS INSTRUMENTS 
OF CONTRACT AND GUARANTY SHOWS THAT THE 
PARTIES DID NOT INTEND THAT COLLINS AND JAMES 
WOULD BE BOUND AS PRINCIPALS TO THE UNIFORM 
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT WITH THE BAILEYS. 
The trial court regarded the issue of who was a 
party to the Uniform Real Estate Contract as decisive to the 
case (TR. 58, 59, 60). This issue arises because of the nature 
of the signature block on the Uniform Real Estate Contract and 
the Guaranty agreement (TR. 56, Ex. P-1). This point had not 
been briefed by counsel (TR. 57) and both submitted post-
trial memoranda. 
The issue of whether or not unqualified signatures 
on a contract purportedly made by a corporation bind the signers 
as principals to the contract has been frequently litigated. The 
cases cited in Respondents' post-trial memorandum are typical of 
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those holding that the signers are principals to the contract. 
Although the cases express similar circumstances, they are 
clearly distinguishable on three points. First, the corporation 
was not identified in the body of the contract as buyer. Second, 
the signatures were all qualified by the off ice of the buyer as 
a member of the corporation. Finally, the personal possessive 
"we", or some form indicating personal liability of the signers, 
was the descriptive term used in describing liability in the 
body of the contract. 
In Taylor v. Reger, 48 N.E. 262 (Ind., 1897), the 
promissory note read: 
"Pendleton, Indiana, Aug. 31, '88. On 
or before September, 1891, we promise to 
~ to the order of Lorenzo D. Reger the 
sum of Four Hundred Dollars, with six 
per cent interest from date, payable 
annually, and attorney's fees, value 
received, without any relief from valuation 
or appraisement laws. 
"The Pendleton Glass Company 
/s/ by B. F. Alman, President 
(Emphasis added.) 
c. B. Orvis, Vice Presidnet 
Charles H. Roach, Secretary 
A. B. Taylor ) 
Benj. Rogers ) Directors 
J. R. Boston )" 
The court determined the intent of the parties 
from the instrument and held that the signers were individually 
liable because the wording of the contract was "we promise 
to pay". 
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In Savings Bank v. Central Market, 54 P. 273, 
(Cal. 1898), the contract was signed as "Central Market 
Company" by its president, secretary, treasurer, and some 
individual stockholders. The stockholders argued that their 
signatures appeared only as ratification of the contract 
and were not intended to bind them individually for the 
corporate debt. The court again emphasized the wording 
"we promise to pay" in holding the stockholders individually 
liable on the contract. The court went on to say that if 
the body of the contract had said "the Central Market 
Company promises to pay", then the signatures of the stock-
holders would have been meaningless. 
Derman v. Brennaman, 149 P. 273 (Okla., 1915) also 
involved a contract that read "we promise to pay". In that 
case, the court allowed parol evidence to determine the intent 
of the parties to be bound as individuals. 
A series of cases that is more directly on point 
is annotated in 82 A.L.R.2d 435, and deals with unqualified 
signatures accompanied by qualified signatures if there has 
been a disclosure that dealings are with a corporation. If 
the contract listed the buyers as obligors in the plurality, 
particularly with the use of the personal pronouns "we" or 
"us", then the unqualified signer was held individually 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 9 -
liable. Caphart v. Dodd, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 584 (1868); 
Whitney v. Sudduth, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 296 (1863); Wiwi v. 
Tebbs, 24 N.E. 624 (Ohio, 1938). 
"In the few cases holding defendants-signers 
not personally liable on an instrument 
containing a qualified signature as well as 
defendants' unqualified ones, the name of the 
corporation appeared in the body as the 
promiser. The defendants-signers of a note 
in Yowell v. Dodd, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 581 (1868) 
were said to not be personally liable on the 
note which stated 'the president and the 
directors of the [company] will pay' and bore 
the signature qualified by 'pres.' preceding 
four unqualified signatures. Whether the 
note bound defendants individually was a 
question of intention to be determined from 
what appeared on the face of the writing, 
said the court, distinguishing other cases 
involving similar notes in that here no 
personal pronounds were used and no several 
promises to pay appeared •••• " (Emphasis 
added.) 82 A.L.R.2d 436. (Note that Yowell 
and Caphart were apparently in the court and 
against the same defendant.) 
The issue of an unqualified signature on a contract 
was examined in Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 197 P.2d 167 (Cal., 1948). 
The contract had a signature block as follows: 
"The Feldheym Co., Inc. 
/s/Dave Schwebel 
Dave Schwebel" 
The plaintiff argued that Schwebel was individually 
liable for the contract. The argument was that since "by" did 
not appear before Schwebel's name, he must have been presumed to 
be acting in an individual capacity. The plaintiff relied on 
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cases where nowhere in the contract the name of the principal 
appeared and where the court held the signer individually liable. 
The court in Carlesimo held those decisions inapplicable because 
the plaintiff was on notice that a corporation was the principal 
to the contract. Paro! evidence was admitted to show that 
Schwebel signed merely as an agent. 
The preceding cases are authority for the proposition 
tha~ where the contract on its face shows that only a corporation 
was intended by the parties to be bound, unqualified signatures do 
not individually bind the signers. Paro! evidence has been allowed 
to show intent of the parties when the intent was not clear from 
the face of the contract. 
The rules of interpretation that determine the intent 
of the parites to contracts are clearly laid out in case law. 
It is fundamental that the intent of the parties should first 
be ascertained from the four corners of the instrument itself, 
second from the other contemporaneous writings concerning the 
same subject matter, and third from extrinsic evidence of the 
intentions, if necessary. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 
306 P.2d 773 {1957). Where two or more instruments are executed 
by the same parties contemporaneously, or at different times 
in the course of the same transaction, and concern the same 
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subject matter, they will be read and construed together so far 
as determining respective rights and interests of the parties 
even though one or both of the agreements do not ref er to each 
other. Bullfrog Marina, Inc., v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266 (Ut, 1972). 
In actions on contracts, the intentions of the parties are 
controlling and normally these intentions will be found from 
the instrument. Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384 (Ut., 1977). 
Applying the principles of contract law to the 
instant case and drawing on case law that determines the binding 
effect of a signature on an individual, it must be concluded 
that Collins and James are not principals to the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract clearly sets forth 
in its body that the agreement is between the Baileys as sellers 
and C & J Industries as buyer (Ex. P-1, ~l). No argument can 
be made that the Baileys did not know they were contracting 
with a corporation. Since the body of the contract did not 
propose to bind anyone except C & J Industries, the unqualified 
signatures of Collins and James are not binding on them as 
individuals. Carlesimo; Yowell; Central Market, supra. 
Examination of the contemporaneous documents, the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract and the Guaranty reveals that 
none of the parties intended that Collins and James be bound 
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as principals to the Uniform Real Estate Contract. The intent 
of the parties is controlling as to the binding effect of the 
agreement. Oberhansly, supra. If the parties intended that 
Collins and James were to be principals to the contract, then 
there would be absolutely no need for execution of the Guaranty 
agreement as any such agreement would be superfluous. The very 
terms of the Guaranty manifest the intent of the parties on the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract. C & J Industries is clearly 
identified as the buyer in the Guaranty with Collins and James 
to be held personally liable for its debts. All references 
to "Buyer" in the contract and the Guaranty refer solely to C & J 
Industries. 
The intent of the parties can clearly be ascertained 
from the documents. Where resolution of the controversy depends 
on the meaning to be given documents, the trial court is in 
no better position and is no better able to determine the meaning 
of documents than is the Supreme Court; hence, as to such an issue, 
the standard presumptions of credibility and verity to be accorded 
the findings and judgments of the trial court do not apply. 
Lake v. Hermise Associates, 552 P.2d 126 (Ut. 1976). 
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III 
THE GUARANTY EXECUTED BY THE PARTIES WAS 
A VALID GUARANTY AGREEMENT AND CANNOT BE 
READ OR INTERPRETED TO EXTEND THE LIABILITY 
OF COLLINS AND JAMES TO BECOME PRINCIPALS 
ON THE CONTEMPORANEOUS UNIFORM REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT. 
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Chisholm Bros. Farm 
Equip. Co., 525 P.2d 976 )Id., 1974) defines guaranty as an 
undertaking or promise that is collateral to the primary or 
principal obligation and that bonds a guarantor to performance 
in the event of non-performance by the principal obliger. 
The guaranty by James and Collins was to, 
" ••• be personally bound to guaranty the 
performance of said corporation [C & J] in each 
and every covenant and agreement under said 
contract ••• in order that said Buyer [C & J] 
may purchase said property, said A. Robert 
Collins and Glade N. James desire to guaranty 
the performance of said corporation." 
Inasmuch as Collins and James promised, in writing, 
to answer personally for the debts of C & J Industries, the 
requisites of a guaranty have been met. 
In their post-trial memorandum, Respondents claimed 
that the last portion of the Guaranty created joint liability 
for Collins and James with C & J, all as principals to the 
contract. Respondents relied on the final clause of the 
Guaranty to support this conclusion: 
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"Each and all of the parties to said 
Uniform Real Estate Contract are jointly 
and severally bound to perform the obli-
gations, covenants and agreements of said 
contract, said Edward o. Bailey and Ruth 
c. Bailey, his wife, as Seller, and said 
C & J Industries Incorporated, a corpor-
ation, as Buyer, and said A. Robert Collins 
and Glade N. James, individually and 
jointly." 
This last clause again refers to C & J Industries 
as "Buyer". The reference to the joint and individual liability 
refers to the liability that had just been created in the guaranty 
agreement. The guaranty of an individual is ·not to be extended 
by implication beyond the express limits or terms of the instru-
ment or its plain intent. Industrial Inv. Corp. v. Rocca, 
596 P.2d 100 {Ida., 1979). Any attempt to expand the obli-
gation of a guarantor to that of principal on the contract 
he guarantees must be held to be improper. 
Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc., v. Service 
Auto Parts, Inc., 596 P.2d 1033 {Ut., 1979), cited by Respondents 
in their post-trial memorandum, does not support extension 
of a guarantor's liability. That case involved a security 
agreement whereby inventory was assigned as collateral and in no 
way was an actual personal guaranty involved. Service argued 
that the security agreement was in fact a guaranty and that 
liability of a guarantor cannot be extended to make him a prin-
cipal to the contract. The court held that the agreement was not 
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a guaranty because it was not a promise to answer personally 
for the debts of another. The court then went on to hold 
that the security agreement was an admission of personal liability 
on the original agreement. 
IV 
THE AGENCY QUESTION WAS NOT LITIGATED AND 
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING ON THE THEORY THAT 
COLLINS AND JAMES ACTED AS AGENTS OF C & J 
INDUSTRIES IN SELLING A PORTION OF THE 
PROPERTY ON THE CONTRACT TO BURGIE. 
The words of Judge Conder at the end of the hearing 
show that he felt the agency question was not decisive in the 
case. 
"Now, the evidence before me is that 
both individuals assumed that they were 
signing as though it was their personal 
property. But there has been a dissolu-
tion and now in their hands, and not acting 
as agents for the corporation. But, if 
those same individuals are buyers under 
Exhibit 1 and are, therefore, bound by 
Paragraph 3A, it isn't going to make any 
difference whether or not they were acting 
as the agents on the sale of Exhibit 2, or 
whether or not they were selling personally." 
(R. 59, 60) 
"That's the question really. 
Wilkins who is raising that. 
contract here?" (R. 59) 
That's Justice 
Who is under 
The court found that C & J Industries was a de facto 
corporation at the time of the Burgie contract, and that as 
a corporation could have signed the contract. (R. 59) 
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Finding of Fact No. 8 on Page 3, signed March 26, 
1982, states: 
"The court also finds that A. Robert 
Collins and Glade N. James were in fact 
buyers under the first contract, or in 
the alternative, were acting as agents 
for C & J Industries in the second 
contract." 
The standard of review in this court for pronounce-
ments of the trial court is that they will only be upheld if 
there is substantial, competent evidence supporting that pronounce-
ment. Hutcheson v. Gleave, 632 P.2d 815 (Ut., 1981); Fisher 
~Taylor, 572 P.2d 393 (Ut. 1977); Dalton v. Dalton, 307 P.2d 
894 (Ut., 1975). 
In determining whether or not agency relation 
exists, the burden of proof is upon the person asserting 
the relation. Salt River Valley Water Assn. v. Giglio, 
549 P.2d 162 (Ariz., 1976); Transamerica Leasing Corp. v. Van's 
Realty Co., 427 P.2d 284 (Ida., 1967); Bininger v. Judy, 
398 P.2d 305 (Kan., 1965); First Nat. Bank of Twin Bridges 
v. Sant, 506 P.2d 835 (Mont., 1973); Moss v. Vadman, 463 
P.2d 159 (Wash., 1969). The law will not presume the 
existence of agency. Aqee v. Gant, 412 P.2d 155 (Okla., 
1966); True v. High Plains Elevator Machinery, 577 P.2d 
991 (Wyo., 1978). The party asserting agency must show 
its nature and extent. Coe v. Esau, 377 P.2d 815 (Okla., 1963). 
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In this court, the issue of the existence of agency was 
examined in Wilkerson v. Stevens, 403 P.2d 31 (Ut., 1965). The 
issue in Wilkerson was whether or not a realtor was liable when 
the real estate agent in his employ absconded with funds when the 
realtor had no listing agreement and knew nothing of the trans-
action. This Court said there was no agency relationship and 
gave the following reasoning: 
"From the facts recited, it will be seen 
that there is no indication that the alleged 
agent intended to be acting for the principal, 
nor that the alleged principal had any such 
intention with respect to such agent •••• " 
Wilkerson, supra. 
In addressing the question of whether an officer of 
a corporation acts as an agent for the corporation signing 
the contract, this Court stated: 
"Supporting of the testimony is the fact 
noted above that there was a substantial 
space left for the signature of the presi-
dent of the corporation [to ratify the 
contract] , presumably after appropriate 
consideration and action thereon by its 
board of directors. No officer or agent 
of a corporation has anv authority to make 
a contract to sell its real estate without 
such action. Foster v. Blake Heights Corp., 
530 P.2d 815, 818 (Ut., 1974). (Emphasis 
added. ) 
The issues of intent of the principal, C & J Indus-
tries, to have Collins and James act as agents through a resolu-
tion of the board of directors was never litigated. The only 
evidence in that regard was that Collins and James thought 
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C & J Industries was defunct (R. 58). This being the case, 
there could be no intention on their part to act for C & J 
as agents or to make a resolution as directors of C & J to take 
corporate action. Where the burden of proof rested on Baileys, 
they have clearly failed to support any allegation of agency. 
The only argument in this matter appears in their Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants' Defense and Counterclaim to the Allegations 
of the Plaintiffs' Complaint that was filed with the court at its 
request after the hearing. On Page 11, Point II 1(1), a summary 
argument is made in favor of agency. The argument assumes agency 
from the fact that Collins and James were officers of C & J. 
Such presumption is clearly not the law. Agee, True, supra. 
The trial court was clearly in error in finding 
that there was an agency relationship because there is no 
substantial evidence to support that conclusion; the issue 
was not litigated; and Respondents failed in meeting the 
burden of proof of that issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The provision of Paragraph 3A of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract between C & J Industries and the Baileys was 
not triggered by the sale to the Burgies. The intent of the 
parties as manifest by the contemporaneous documents will not 
support a conclusion that Collins and James were principals to 
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the contract of sale. There was no substantial evidence adduced 
at trial that would support a finding that Collins and James 
acted as agents of C & J Industries in entering into a contract 
to sell part of the real property covered in the original contract. 
Collins and James' liability as guarantors may not be extended to 
make them principals on the contract they guaranteed. 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants respectfully 
petition this court to reverse the decision of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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